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This article covers a little-known period of Raúl 
Prebisch's life, when he was Chairman of the Central 
Bank of Argentina. In order to set the stage for the 
discussion that follows, the author first provides 
background information concerning Argentina's 
economic policy, the creation of the Central Bank 
and the tasks assigned to it during the period in 
question. 
Particular attention is devoted to the steps that 
were taken to put the banks on a sounder footing and 
to streamline the banking system, as well as the 
banking law and the supervision of banks, the forma-
tion of a securities market, open-market and redis-
counting operations and exchange policy. The effects 
of these policies during the upswing and downswing 
of the 1935-1939 economic cycle are examined, as are 
their relationship to the new conditions created by 
the Second World War. 
Finally, the author takes a look at the lessons to 
be drawn from Prebisch's handling of monetary 
affairs with a view to their application to the present 
situation. 
'Prepared for inclusion in a book in tribute to the 
memory of Alfredo Machado Gómez. 
••Adviser to the Central Bank of Venezuela. 
Introduction 
Raúl Prebisch's achievements during the course 
of his international career are widely known by 
all economists, in Latin America and elsewhere, 
and by many Latin Americans outside the pro-
fession, but his work at the national level is 
virtually unknown, even by Spanish-speaking 
economists who specialize ¡n monetary theory 
and policy. Nonetheless, the work he did during 
this phase in his life was just as extraordinary 
and productive as were his subsequent activities 
in the United Nations. When Raúl Prebisch was 
appointed as a consultant to the Economic Com-
mission for Latin America in 1948, he was 
already 47 years of age and had a brilliant career 
to his credit, spanning the years from 1930 to 
1943, first as an Under-Secretary of the Treasury 
and later as the General Manager of the Central 
Bank of the Argentine Republic. Between 1944 
and 1948, Prebisch worked as a professional 
consultant and advised various governments and 
official agencies, including the Banco de México. 
It was there that in 1945 he held his talks on che 
central banking system that were to be published 
many years later, together with the annual 
reports for the years 1935-1943, by the Central 
Bank of the Argentine Republic in two volumes 
which should be required reading for all students 
of monetary policy.1 During his time as a consul-
tant, Prebisch's services were also contracted, in 
1947, by the Central Bank of Venezuela, to which 
he submitted a report that was later published in 
the Revista de Hacienda (Treasury Review) of 
Venezuela.2 In his report, Raúl Prebisch placed 
great emphasis on the need to regularize Vene-
zuela's economic growth. To this end, he recom-
mended the creation of a fund of 100 million 
bolívares, which at that time was equivalent to 
around 8% of fiscal revenues, for the purpose of 
offsetting cyclical fluctuations. These resources 
were to be provided by the Treasury, but the fund 
was to administered by the Central Bank. In 1949 
Prebisch began to work as an adviser to the 
Economic Commission for Latin America, 
'Central Bank of the Argentine Republic, La creación del 
Banco Central y la experiencia monetaria argentina entre los años 
19351973, Buenos Aires, 1972. 
2Raúl Prebisch, Dictamen acerca de los anteproyectos sobre 
Banco Central y Bancos, Revista de Hacienda, Caracas, September 
1948. 
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where he launched his international career with 
the writing of his famous treatise on the deterio-
ration of the terms of trade. He later became the 
Executive Secretary of the Commission itself, of 
UNCTAD and of ILPES and served as an adviser 
to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 
In this article, however, I will speak only of his 
career in the Central Bank. 
1. Background 
I first heard Raúl Prebisch's name in April or 
May 1945 from Robert Triffin, who referred to 
him as one of the best economists he had ever 
met. Since Robert Triffin knew all the great 
economists of the period, I thought he was exag-
gerating, but I later came to see that this was not 
so. In any event, the fact that I heard Prebisch's 
name for the first time 11 years after I had begun 
studying economics and five years after I had 
written a book on monetary issues testifies to the 
lack of communication among Latin American 
economists at that time and, of course, does not 
speak well of the comprehensiveness of my 
scholarship either. In my own defense, however, 
I should point out that I did know that around 
1940 the Central Bank of the Argentine Repub-
lic had applied a number of innovative anti-
cyclical policies which had been praised on 
numerous occasions by the League of Nations in 
its Yearbooks on currency and banking. I was 
thus aware of Argentina's outstanding monetary 
policies, but I did not know the name of the 
person who had devised them, had put them into 
practice and had explained their purpose and 
import in the terse and clear prose used in the 
annual reports of the Central Bank of the Argen-
tine Republic. 
A year and a half later, I met Prebisch in 
Mexico City at the First Conference of Central 
Bank Technical Experts of the Americas, which 
was held in September 1946. This was the begin-
ning of a friendship that was to last for very 
nearly 40 years and which was ended only by his 
death in April 1986. As I have said on repeated 
occasions, my admiration for him was as great as 
that which any man can feel for another. 
2. The effectiveness of Argentina's 
economic policy from 1930 to 1943 
From 1930 to 1935 Raúl Prebisch served as 
Under-Secretary of the Treasury and as the chief 
economic adviser to the Government of Argen-
tina. From 1935, the year in which the Central 
Bank was founded, to 1943 he was its General 
Manager, its head economist and the person who 
formulated and determined its policies. Between 
1930 and 1943 Argentina's economic policy was 
largely under his direction, and it is he who 
deserves the credit for its success. Argentina was 
one of the countries most severely affected by the 
Great Depression. As shown in table 1, the 
country's export earnings and capital inflows 
declined so sharply that by 1933 its imports had 
dropped to 42% of their 1929 level in real terms. 
However, the economic policy applied in the 
country succeeded in lessening the decrease in 
the real gross domestic product, which only fell 
to 86% of the record high it had reached in 1929-
By 1939 the real domestic product was 15% 
greater than it had been ten years earlier. Argen-
tina's policy was thus much more effective than 
that of the United States, where real income had 
fallen 31% in 1933 and had barely recovered by 
1939, when its real level was just 1.3% higher 
than before the depression. 
Table ! 
A R G E N T I N A : E C O N O M I C T R E N D S , 
1929-1943 
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of the Argentine Republic, New Haven, Connecticut, Yale 
University Press, 1970. 
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Between 1932 and 1939 Argentina's manu-
facturing industry grew at an average rate of 
7.1% per year or, if the calculations are based on 
the peak level achieved in 1929, at an annual rate 
of 4.4%, which was much higher than the 2.5% 
rate recorded in 1944-1955, the years that are 
generally considered to have been those of the 
greatest industrial progress in Argentina's mod-
ern history. In concluding this brief review of the 
Argentine economy during the Great Depres-
sion, it should be noted that in 1939 wholesale 
prices were only 12.5% higher than they had 
been in 1929, while the cost-of-living index 
stood at virtually the same level. 
3. The founding of the Central Bank 
During Raúl Prebisch's tenure as Under-
Secretary of the Treasury, much of his time was 
devoted to the preparation of legislation provid-
ing for the creation of a central bank, an institu-
tion which did not exist in Argentina at that 
time. In its stead, there were two agencies which, 
between them, performed its functions in a not 
entirely satisfactory fashion: the Conversion 
Fund, which issued the local currency in 
exchange for foreign currency and which, on an 
exceptional basis, was authorized to buy govern-
ment securities; and the Banco de la Nación 
Argentina, which was the depository and fiscal 
agent of the Government and which on excep-
tional occasions made loans to other banks. In 
addition, the Exchange Control Office had been 
established at the start of the Great Depression, 
and this agency also carried out activities which 
were closely related to central banking functions. 
Nonetheless, it was generally agreed that this 
system did not work well and, in spite of the fear 
that the creation of a central bank would cause 
inflation, the establishment of such an institu-
tion was felt to be necessary. 
In 1932 Raúl Prebisch was the most active 
member of a commission that had been organ-
ized to prepare legislation for the purpose of 
creating a central bank. The commission was 
apparently unable to complete its work because a 
new Minister of the Treasury decided to entrust 
the task to a foreign expert. He asked the Bank of 
England to make available the services of Sir 
Otto Niemeyer, who drafted a bill which was 
sent to Congress, after it had been modified and 
supplemented by Argentine experts, the most 
notable among them being Raúl Prebisch, who, 
once the law was passed, was appointed as the 
first General Manager of the institution. I am 
convinced that the provisions in this law that 
made the Bank so extraordinarily effective, as 
well as the supporting institutions which con-
tributed to its success, were the work of Prebisch. 
In the talks he gave at the Banco de México 
in 1944 on Argentina's experience with mone-
tary affairs (which, as I said earlier, should be 
required reading in all university classes on 
monetary and banking matters), Raúl Prebisch 
was too much of a gentleman to claim credit for 
the modifications made in Niemeyer's draft leg-
islation, but this fact nonetheless comes across 
implicitly in his narration of the process, in 
words that deserve to be quoted both because of 
the light they shed on the paternity of this legis-
lation and because they demonstrate the extraor-
dinary foresight with which it was prepared. 
Prebisch said: 
"Mr. Hueyo, the Minister of the Treasury, 
who had been a member of the Commission 
which drafted the plans for the Central Bank 
during Uriburu's tenure as Minister, abandoned 
the idea of revaluing gold and confined his 
efforts to drafting a banking law and some 
reforms to the Law on Rediscounting aimed at 
providing funds to banks with locked-up capital. 
At the same time he requested the advisory ser-
vices of Sir Otto Niemeyer of the Bank of Eng-
land, who in early 1933 prepared draf legislation 
for the creation of a central bank and for a law on 
banks. In 1934 Dr. Pinedo arrived at the Minis-
try and undertook the reform of the monetary 
and banking system. The draft legislation he 
sent to Congress conformed to the structure and 
technical provisions of the bills prepared by Sir 
Otto Niemeyer but differed radically from them 
as regards the concept of bank policy which it 
embodied in relation to both the present bank-
ing situation and the future course of this policy. 
Let us see exactly what these differences were: 
"In so far as the banking system was con-
cerned, Niemeyer's draft legislation did not pro-
pose any steps aimed at putting the banks on a 
sounder footing. In contrast, the new bills pro-
vided for the creation of the Mobilization Insti-
tute for this purpose using funds obtained from 
the revaluation of gold, as discussed earlier. The 
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financial rehabilitation of the banking system 
was regarded as essential in order for the Central 
Bank to be able to commence its operations 
without hindrance or distraction. In addition, 
whereas the new legislation also relied on the 
revaluation in order to pay the floating debt, 
Niemeyer's draft proposed that 130 million 
pesos in Treasury funds be used for its amortiza-
tion along with a portion of the Central Bank's 
profits. 
"The main differences with respect to Cen-
tral Bank policy were the following: 
"Firstly: The new legislation provided for 
the creation of the Bank Inspection Office as an 
organ of the Central Bank and gave it broad 
powers for examining the standing of credit 
institutions. The bills drafted by Niemeyer, how-
ever, would have required only that the banks 
submit fi nancial statements to the Central Bank. 
"Secondly: The new legislation gave the 
Central Bank a means of absorbing excess funds 
in the market so that it might influence the 
cyclical process. Niemeyer's legislation made no 
reference whatsoever to any instrument of this 
sort. 
"Thirdly: Whereas under Niemeyer's legis-
lation the Central Bank's holdings of foreign 
exchange would not have been subject to any 
limitation whatsoever, the government's new 
draft legislation stipulated that the Central Bank 
could have no more than 20% of its total hold-
ings of gold and foreign exchange in the form of 
foreign exchange, while the rest would have to 
be held entirely in precious metals; furthermore, 
only one-half of this 20% in foreign exchange 
could be counted in the calculation of the Central 
Bank's legal reserves. 
"Fourthly: Under Niemeyer's bill, the Cen-
tral Bank's discount rate could be raised if the 
level of monetary reserves fell to less than 33% 
of cash holdings. The government's new legisla-
tion eliminated this restriction, which would 
undoubtedly have had had serious repercussions 
on the overall economic situation if it had been 
applied during a cyclical downturn at a time 
when gold was being exported. 
"Fifthly: While the government's new legis-
lation, bearing in mind the nature of the portfo-
lios and operating procedures of Argentine 
banks, allowed for the discounting of unsecured 
paper, i.e., paper having a single signature, plus 
the signature of che discounting bank, Niemey-
er's draft called for two signatures in addition to 
that of the bank and eliminated industrial dis-
count paper. 
"The above comparison clearly shows that 
Argentina's Central Bank Law represents an 
adaptation of Niemeyer's draft to the Argentine 
context which modified it so as to bring it into 
line with the actual circumstances in 
Argentina."3 
As may be seen, the Mobilization Institute, 
the Central Bank's banking inspection unit, and 
the-authorization of the sale and repurchase of 
consolidated treasury bonds, i.e., the original 
aspects of this law and the instruments which 
allowed the Central Bank to perform its work so 
well during its first eight years, were the crea-
tions of Prebisch. 
4. The economic situation at the 
time of the creation of the 
Central Bank and the 
tasks it faced 
In 1935 when the Central Bank began its opera-
tions, Argentina had, for the most part, come out 
of the 1929-1930 crisis thanks to the govern-
ment's industrialization policy and to the partial 
recovery of the external market. By that year, the 
government had balanced its current income and 
expenditure as a result of its reduction of public 
spending, the institution of tax reforms and the 
greater receipts made possible by the expansion 
of the national product. The balance of payments 
was also once again at equilibrium, and the 
exchange system had been stabilized with the 
operation of a dual exchange system in which the 
free rate fluctuated around a level only slightly 
higher than the official exchange rate. 
All of these advances, which pre-dated the 
creation of the Central Bank, had in large part 
been made possible by the work of the man who 
was to become the Bank's first General Manager. 
As Under-Secretary of the Treasury and chief 
economic adviser to the government, Raúl 
Prebisch had played a decisive role in the adop-
tion of a moderate policy of tariff protection 
which had promoted the creation of new indus-
'Central Bank of the Argentine Republic, op. cit., p. 267. 
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tries, in the reduction of public spending, the 
establishment of an income tax, and the organi-
zation of the dual exchange system whereby the 
free exchange rate rose enough to discourage 
capital outflows but not so much as to produce 
economic distortions. 
These successes notwithstanding, a consid-
erable part of bank portfolios remained immo-
bilized, and no public securities market, either 
short- or long-term, had yet been developed; 
such a market was needed so that a portion of 
savings could be channelled towards public 
investment and so that open-market operations 
could be conducted for the purpose of absorbing 
excess liquidity during economic booms and 
feeding it back into the economy during down-
turns. The immobility of bank portfolios had 
been caused by the excessively open-handed 
credit policy followed by the banks during the 
pre-crisis period, by the decrease in the prices of 
agricultural export products and in farmers' 
incomes, and by the saturation of government 
paper. The absence of a public securities market, 
for its part, was to some extent a natural conse-
quence of the country's stage of economic devel-
opment. A much more significant factor, 
however, was the imbalance in public finances 
which had existed until one or two years before, 
inasmuch as Argentina was already generating 
enough savings so that a portion of these funds 
might be channelled'to the purchase of securities 
issued by the public sector. 
By virtue of its very creation, the new institu-
tion brought under one roof the central banking 
functions which had previously been scattered 
among the Conversion Fund, the Banco de la 
Nación Argentina and the Exchange Control 
Office, thereby making it possible to conduct 
these operations more efficiently. In addition to 
its routine functions, however, the new institu-
tion was confronted with the following tasks: 
a) to put the banking system on a sound footing, 
b) to create a public securities market, and c) to 
use this market, in conjunction with the 
exchange system, in order to apply an anti-
cyclical policy aimed at preparing the country for 
the slump in external inflows which was 
expected to occur within the next two or three 
years. As will be discussed below, the Central 
Bank accomplished these tasks fully and 
extremely efficiently. 
5. Putting the banking system 
on a sound footing and 
freeing its assets 
The position of the banking system was 
improved and the banks' assets were freed for 
use by means of the revaluation of gold reserves 
at the time they were transferred from the Con-
version Fund to the Central Bank and the alloca-
tion of the resulting profits to the creation of a 
new body, the Bank Investment Mobilization 
Institute, which bought up the banks' public 
securities and the overdue private loans they had 
in their portfolios. The the Mobilization Insti-
tute was thus created in a thoroughly heterodox 
manner which was potentially extremely infla-
tionary. Instead of sparking a rapid price and 
wage spiral, however, this measure had highly 
positive effects: it served to unblock bank portfo-
lios, made possible the establishment of a public 
securities market and gave the Central Bank the 
ability to carry out transactions on the open 
market. 
The value of the Conversion Fund's gold 
reserves had been set in the 1920s, before the 
devaluation of the pound sterling and the dollar 
and before the depreciation of the Argentine 
peso in relation to these currencies; hence, the 
revaluation of these gold reserves nearly doubled 
their value and rendered an accounting profit of 
701.1 million pesos, which was equivalent to one 
and one-half times the value of the cash reserves 
(485.3 million pesos), maintained by the banks 
prior to the freeing of their assets. The use of 
this sum to purchase blocked assets more than 
doubled cash reserves and could have led to a 
huge increase in bank credit; this increase did not 
actually occur, however, because the Central 
Bank reabsorbed one-third of the growth in cash 
reserves through the sale of securities and per-
suaded the banks to refrain from expanding 
their lending activity. The Central Bank's power 
of persuasion was reinforced by the fact that, as 
shown in table 2, cash reserves had fallen to such 
extremely low levels that even this enormous 
increase only raised them to a level just slightly 
higher than those recorded in the three-year 
period from 1926 to 1928. In addition, yet 
another factor was that the troubles experienced 
by the banks during the years that their assets 
had been tied up caused them to adopt a much 
more conservative attitude. 
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Between December 1934 and December 
1935 bank reserves rose from 14.0% to 24.7% of 
their deposits; however, loans increased by just 
1.7%, the money supply expanded by less than 
10% and the cost of living climbed only.4.5% 
(see table 3)- Wholesale prices dropped 1.0% 
and the price of the pound sterling on the free 
market went down from 19.48 to 18.09- The 
financial "explosion" which some had feared did 
not occur. In creating the Bank Investment 
Mobilization Institute, Raúl Prebisch was play-
ing with dynamite, but he knew how to keep it 
from going off! 
6. The Bank Law and banking 
inspection 
Together with the laws that created the Central 
Bank and the Mobilization Institute, Congress 
passed a General Bank Law which prohibited 
banks of deposit from making long-term loans 
and from owning real estate or corporate stock. 
These operations had been permitted up until 
that time and they had been part of the reason 
why the banks' portfolios had become immobil-
ized. With a view to enforcing these regulations 
and monitoring bank operations, the Central 
Bank Law provided that this institution should 
form an inspection department. 
The General Bank Law was an orthodox law 
which conformed to the standard provisions 
contained in the legislation on this subject. The 
Table 2 
A R G E N T I N A : B A N K DEPOSITS A N D 
RESERVES, 1926-1935 
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Source: Central Bank of the Argentine Republic, annual report for 
1935. 
Source: Central Bank of the Argentine Republic, annual report for 
1935 and the statistical supplement of August 1937. 
Total loans minus loans absorbed by the Mobilization Institute in 
May 1935. 
organization of a bank inspection system was, 
per se> also an orthodox step. However, the 
decision to make it a unit of the Central Bank was 
not at all orthodox, but was instead a complete 
departure from the customary practices of that 
period. In countries where the inspection of 
banks was practiced at that time, this function 
was performed by an independent agency, which 
generally reported to the Ministry of the Treas-
ury. Raúl Prebisch understood, however, that 
such supervision would be much more effective 
if it were backed up by the economic pressure 
that the lender of last resort could exert. In 
addition, he took into account the fact that the 
inspectors could be paid higher salaries and 
enjoy greater stability if they were staff members 
of the Central Bank. This approach, which was 
an exceptional one in 1935, has come into more 
general use over time, as may be seen by the fact 
that in 14 out of 22 Latin American countries the 
corresponding Superintendency is now part of 
the Central Bank or Monetary Board.4 
7. The formation of a securities market 
The main tool of monetary policy used by the 
Central Bank of the Argentine Republic during 
Prebisch's time was the purchase and sale of 
••Centre for Latin American Monetary Studies (CEMLA), 
Informe sobre supervisión y fiscalización bancaria, Mexico City, 
1982, p. 21. 
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securities on the open market. This policy has 
also been the one most commonly employed by 
the central banks of financially developed coun-
tries since the late nineteenth century and espe-
cially since the end of the First World War. It is 
generally believed, as I myself thought until 
quite recently, that Prebisch had been able to 
make use of this instrument because a securities 
market was already in existence in Argentina. As 
we have seen, however, this was not so. The 
money market in Argentina was created at the 
same time that the Central Bank was established. 
Its formation was made possible, first of all, by 
the greater liquidity resulting from the revalua-
tion of gold and from its use to unblock bank 
portfolios; an equally important factor, however, 
was the policy of empowering the Central Bank 
to issue and sell share certificates in the consoli-
dated treasury bonds which the Bank had 
received from the Conversion Fund as part col-
lateral for its monetary issue, since these certifi-
cates were easier to sell on the market due to 
their short term and the fact that they were 
backed by both the government and the Central 
Bank. 
Before Argentina took this step, the experts 
on such issues thought that a central bank should 
not issue or sell bonds as a means of reducing the 
money supply because it could diminish the con-
fidence of the public, which might think that the 
Central Bank was in need of resources. So strong 
was this belief that in 1941 the White Mission, 
which conducted the studies concerning the 
organization of the Banco Nacional de Cuba, 
recommended a complex mechanism for absorb-
ing funds whereby bonds would be issued by the 
Currency Stabilization Fund, which was an 
account of the Central Bank rather than an insti-
tution as such.5 Raúl Prebisch did not share this 
fear, and from the very start of its operations in 
May 1935, the Central Bank of the Argentine 
Republic issued and sold share certificates in 
consolidated treasury bonds. Nobody thought 
that these securities were issued because the 
Central Bank needed resources, and everyone 
felt confident about the creditworthiness of the 
'These recommendations were acted upon seven years later 
when the Banco Nacional de Cuba was created, However, this bank 
never issued bonds in either its own name or in that of the 
Currency Stabilization Fund. 
certificates, which met with immediate 
acceptance. 
The most important factor of all in the crea-
tion of the securities market, however, was the 
enormous stock of money injected into the econ-
omy by the Mobilization Institute. This was 
what put the banks in a position to purchase 
share certificates in consolidated treasury bonds 
and, later on, other Central Bank securities and 
treasury bills. The operations undertaken by the 
Institute in order to free up the bank's assets 
virtually doubled their reserves and provided 
them with more than enough funds to purchase 
securities from the Central Bank. 
8. Open-market operations 
In 1935 the Argentine economy was growing at 
an annual rate of 4.5% and was generating a 
gross domestic product equal to nearly 90.0% of 
its 1929 level. Neither the growth rate nor the 
degree of utilization of the production apparatus 
made it advisable to apply a monetary policy 
aimed at curbing the expansion, but the huge 
amount of liquidity that was fed into the econ-
omy in order to place the banking system on a 
sounder footing could have sparked a large 
increase in lending activity, in the means of 
payment, in aggregate demand, imports and pri-
ces. It was therefore necessary to absorb the 
excess liquidity. Accordingly, the Central Bank 
immediately initiated the issue and sale of share 
certificates in the consolidated treasury bonds it 
had in its portfolio. The certificates were issued 
for a 90-day term and with an annual yield of 
2.75% and were offered in competitive bidding 
with a guarantee that they would be repurchased 
at the sale price. From the very beginning they 
were sold at a premium, which lowered their 
yield to 2.52%, 1.98% and 1.72% in December 
1935, 1936 and 1937, respectively. 
Before the end of 1936, the Bank's a sales 
volume had reached 400 million pesos, which 
was equal to the amount of consolidated bonds it 
had in its portfolio; it therefore began to offer 
treasury bills (with the proceeds from these sales 
being used to retire public debts) and subse-
quently issued gold and foreign exchange certifi-
cates. By August 1937 it had sold 741 million 
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Table 4 
A R G E N T I N A : LIQUID ASSETS A N D A B S O R P T I O N , 1934-1938 




















































































Source: Central Bank of the Argentine Republic, annual reports and statistical supplements. 
pesos worth of the three types of securities.6 
However, as shown in table 4, the banking sys-
tem's liquid assets had begun to drop from their 
level of the month before, when they had 
reached a peak of 1 543 million pesos. The Cen-
tral Bank therefore moved swiftly to reduce its 
sales of securities, bringing them down to 373 
million pesos in December 1938 and to progres-
sively lower levels during the following years. In 
late 1941, the Central Bank was still issuing and 
selling certificates (in the amount of 30 million 
pesos), but its reason for doing so was probably 
co retain the use of a tool which it might need 
again in the future. 
In che talks he gave at the Banco de México, 
Prebisch explained that the Central Bank 
authorities understood that it would have been 
much better to sell these securities to depositors 
rather than to the banks because this would have 
reduced both the public's purchasing power and 
the banks' lending capacity at one and the same 
time and because it would have been a more 
effective means of diminishing the banks' lend-
ing capacity, since it would then have been 
beyond the banks' power to recover this capacity 
6in addition to selling certificates and treasury bills, the Bank 
had bought 207 million pesos worth of dollars using resources 
from the Foreign Exchange Fund; this also involved a sterilization 
of funds. According to the figures available to the author, such 
sterilization operations amounted to a maximum of 948 million 
pesos. According to Nurkse, however, these operations totalled 
over 1 billion pesos as of June 1937. 
later merely by deciding to do so. The sale of 
short-term securities to banks allows the latter 
to regain their lending capacity upon the expira-
tion of the securities simply by refraining from 
repurchasing them, something which they can-
not do if the securities have been sold to the 
public; the banks' liquidity will nonetheless have 
been reduced because the public will have with-
drawn money from its bank deposits in order to 
buy the securities. The Central Bank of the 
Argentine Republic was unable, however, to sell 
securities to the public because, in the case of 
share certificates, the law prohibited it from 
doing so and because, in the case of other securi-
ties, the banks opposed such a step on the 
grounds that the Central Bank should not com-
pete with them in attracting the public's 
resources. 
This is an extremely interesting aspect of 
Argentina's experience with monetary affairs 
because the argument that the Central Bank 
should not compete with other banks has been 
the major obstacle to the use of so important a 
policy tool as is the sale and purchase on the 
open market of securities issued by the Central 
Bank itself. The argument is not a valid one 
because the sale by a central bank of its own 
securities is not a form of competition but rather 
a means of monetary regulation which can be 
used as an alternative to raising bank reserve 
requirements. Nevertheless, this argument has 
been employed successfully to prevent the use of 
this instrument. 
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9. A policy of persuasion 
Even though it was brilliantly conceived and 
executed, the authorities' policy of absorbing 
excess funds could not have prevented a sharp 
increase in bank loans if it had not been for the 
Central Bank's effectiveness in persuading the 
banks to follow a prudent credit policy. Indeed, at 
no time did the sale of securities manage to bring 
down the banks' cash holdings to less than 
21.0% of deposits, which was almost double the 
legal minimum reserve requirement.7 This made 
it possible, as soon as their reserves increased for 
the banks to engage in such keen competition 
among themselves that they even took up the 
practice of visiting the clients of rival institu-
tions in order to offer them credit at lower rates 
of interest. This was a cause of serious concern 
for the Central Bank authorities, not only for 
monetary reasons but also because their knowl-
edge of the situation told them that this was not 
the right time to lower profits and enter into 
high-risk operations, since there were many 
severe financial problems that had yet to be 
resolved. The Central Bank called upon the 
banks to co-ordinate their policies and to reach 
an agreement among themselves by which they 
would pledge to refrain from lowering the inter-
est rate to below 4%. At first the banks resisted 
the idea, but the Central Bank persevered and 
the agreement was ultimately signed. 
Along with its successful effort to curb any 
undue expansion of lending activity, the Central 
Bank made a recommendation to the banks 
(which they accepted) that they not pay divi-
dends of over 5% so that they might build up 
their reserves. Thus, without the aid of any legal 
provision, but merely by means of its powers of 
persuasion, the Central Bank managed to con-
vince the banks to use most of their profits to 
increase their capital. 
10. Redis counting 
During Prebisch's tenure as General Manager, 
the Central Bank of the Argentine Republic 
'The law provided for a minimum reserve requirement of 
16.0% on demand deposits a nd of 8.0% on time deposits. Since the 
former amounted to around one-third of the total and the latter to 
about two-thirds, the average minimum reserve requirement was 
between 10.0% and 11.0%. 
refrained from carrying out rediscounting opera-
tions except during a brief period in 1940, and 
even then the amounts involved were relatively 
small. In May of that year, the intensification of 
the fighting in the world war sent shock waves 
through the stock market and created a very 
uneasy situation for the banks, which feared a 
steep decline in foreign trade. The Central Bank 
intervened aggressively in the stock market. It 
bought up a considerable amount of securities, 
thereby stabilizing the market quotations, and 
asked the banks to "avoid placing restrictions on 
credit which might disturb the flow of business 
and cause unnecessary selling", telling them that 
"if, despite the banks' greatly improved cash 
position, they find it necessary to resort to the 
instrument which the law has made available to 
the Central Bank for facilitating banking opera-
tions, then the banks shall be permitted to dis-
count as much of the eligible paper in their 
portfolios as they deem necessary". In response 
to this invitation, "major banks communicated 
their decision to carry out such rediscounting 
operations immediately, despite the abundance 
of liquid assets at their disposal, as an express 
means of showing their willingness to provide 
the marketplace with all the resources it might 
need".8 In June, the Central Bank carried out 
rediscounting operations totalling 79 million 
pesos (equivalent to around 10% of the banks' 
cash holdings at that time), with payment being 
made in full before the beginning of the follow-
ing year. 
In the talks he gave at the Banco de México, 
Prebisch did not speak about rediscountinguntil 
one of the final sessions, and then said that he 
had not mentioned it as an expansionary policy 
tool because "during the downswing of the cycle, 
private enterprises are not inclined to use more 
credit to expand their businesses since, generally 
speaking, the mood is one of reluctance rather 
than optimism".9 Prebisch did not speak of 
rediscounting as a tight-money policy either 
because, in its early days, the Central Bank of the 
Argentine Republic could not have made use of 
this tool due to the huge amount of excess liquid-
ity created by the policy aimed at putting the 
banks on a sounder footing. 
^Central Bank of the Argentine Republic, op. cit., p. 127. 
'Central Bank of the Argentine Republic, op. cit., p. 499. 
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11. Advising the government 
During the first two years of its existence, the 
Bank does not seem to have exercised its func-
tion as an economic adviser to the government, 
at least not in regard to sufficiently important 
issues to warrant mention in the Bank's annual 
reports or in the talks given at the Banco de 
Mexico; however, when the country entered into 
the next downturn of the economic cycle, the 
Central Bank then began to perform this func-
tion in a very thorough manner indeed. When 
exports slumped during the second half of 1937 
and this decrease began to have an effect on 
domestic activity, the Bank recommended that 
steps be taken to counteract the slowdown. In 
this connection, Prebisch said the following: 
"Should the Central Bank help to reduce domes-
tic economic activity so as to bring the balance of 
payments into a perfect state of equilibrium, or 
should it give priority to 'domestic economic 
activity and seek other means of influencing the 
balance of payments? This was the question we 
asked ourselves beginning in the second half of 
1937, and it was posed with increasing urgency 
as the cyclical downturn deepened. The Central 
Bank was quick to understand its domestic 
responsibility in the face of this economic situa-
tion, especially in view of the new fact of Argen-
tine life represented by what had only in recent 
years become a hard-working industry. The ten-
dency, then, was to protect domestic economic 
activity and to resort once again to exchange 
control measures in order to prevent the 
increased purchasing power created by the 
Banco de la Nación to aid farming activities (and 
which was later to spread to the other sectors of 
the economy) from going to imports and to 
ensure that it would instead continue to circulate 
within the local market."10 
In order to offset the slump, the Bank recom-
mended that the government should tighten its 
exchange controls, which had become virtually 
negligible during the final stages of the upswing 
in the cycle. The Bank also supported the 
government's policy of purchasing harvest sur-
pluses and played a decisive role in drafting an 
economic reactivation plan, whose text reflected, 
'Banco Central de la República Argentina, op. cit., p. 400. 
according to Carlos Diaz-Alejandro, "the unmis-
takable style of Raúl Prebisch".11 
12. Exchange policy 
In 1931 the foreign exchange crisis and capital 
flight made it necessary for Argentina to estab-
lish exchange controls, initially under a rigid 
system providing for a single exchange rate and 
directed at regulating all transactions, and later 
under a differential exchange system that 
covered around 85% of all transactions, with the 
remaining 15% being allowed to take place on 
the free market. This system provided for three 
exchange rates: one of 15 pesos to the pound 
sterling for major exports, another of 16 pesos to 
the pound sterling for essential imports, and a 
floating rate for all other current transactions 
and capital movements. The Bank intervened 
actively in the free market in order to keep the 
exchange rate within a range of 17-20 pesos to 
the pound sterling, i.e., a range of from 0.6% to 
25.0% above the exchange rate for imports on 
the official market. 
Without going into a detailed description of 
either the system or the modifications made in it 
in 1935-1943, it can be maintained that exchange 
controls were handled with extraordinary effec-
tiveness in order to stimulate exports, curb 
imports, promote national industry and supple-
ment the anti-cyclical effect of the country's 
domestic monetary policy. During periods when 
exports were on the rise, the inflow of foreign 
exchange pushed the free exchange rate down, 
lowering it to 17, but at that point the Central 
Bank would start buying in order to prevent the 
rate from dropping below that level. When 
exports were declining, the exchange rate 
climbed, thereby helping to staunch the outflow 
of foreign exchange, but the Bank would then 
start selling and would thus keep the rate from 
going above 20. 
During the period under examination, the 
free market in Argentina served to regulate both 
domestic and foreign capital movements and to 
hold down imports during cyclical downswings, 
"Carlos F. Diaz-Alejandro, Essays on the Economic History 
of the Argentine Republic, New Haven, Connecticut, Yale Univer-
sity Press, 1970, p. 105. 
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and, since exchange rate fluctuations were kept 
within a narrow band, no price distortions were 
created and no appreciable incentive was pro-
vided for violating the controls. The moderate 
nature of these fluctuations was due to the Cen-
tral Bank's policy of intervening in the market, 
but market expectations were the factor which 
made this policy's success possible. Throughout 
the period, domestic and foreign investors' faith 
in the Argentine economy remained unshaken; 
investors might feel that temporary capital 
transfers were advisable when the economy was 
undergoing transitory difficulties, but the ten-
dency to withdraw capital slackened when the 
free exchange rate rose by 10%, 15% or, at the 
most, 25% since they felt confident that these 
difficulties would pass and the price of the pound 
and of the dollar would drop once again. 
The talks he gave at the Banco de México 
demonstrate that Prebisch understood quite 
clearly that it did not make sense to place quan-
titative restrictions on the imports of a product 
that would reduce the supply to below the exist-
ing level of demand while at the same time 
selling foreign exchange inexpensively to 
importers of that same product because the low 
price of the foreign exchange would benefit 
importers rather than consumers, inasmuch as 
such restrictions would push the product's sale 
price on the domestic market above the import 
cost, thereby providing intermediaries with 
undue profits. In 1944 Prebisch had already 
grasped the significance of the Sohmen effect, 
thus called because it was first described by that 
author in 1958, even though Triffin had used the 
same concept many years before as the basis for 
his recommendation that the authorities lift the 
quantitative restrictions applying to imports in 
Ecuador in 1947.12 
13. The effects of the anti-cyclical 
policy 
In the preceding sections we have examined, one 
by one, the policies applied by the Central Bank 
of the Argentine Republic during the period 
l2Egon Sohmen, The effect of devaluation on the price sys-
tem, Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1958. For Prebisch's 
explanation of this concept, see Central Bank of the Argentine 
Republic, op. cit., p. 308. 
under examination (i.e., open-market transac-
tions, rediscount i ng, the persuasion of the pri-
vate sector and the provision of advisory services 
to the government). Now let us see what the 
effects of these policies were during the course of 
the period in question: first, in the cyclical 
upswing of 1935-1937, when they were used to 
counteract inflationary pressures; later, in the 
cyclical downswing of 1938-1939, when their use 
was aimed at preventing a slowdown in the real 
economy; and, finally, in the years 1940-1943, 
when the Bank was faced with the task of 
counteracting, supplementing and rectifying the 
serious distortions produced by the Second 
World War. 
Strangely enough, the first policy imple-
mented by the Central Bank was not an anti-
cyclical measure, but rather a potentially 
pro-cyclical one. As we saw earlier, the first step 
taken by the Bank (through its auxiliary institu-
tion, the Mobilization Institute) was to improve 
the quality of the banks' portfolios by purchasing 
from them government securities and doubtful 
private credits. This measure might have had 
explosive repercussions, but did not because its 
potentially inflationary effects were offset (or 
even more than offset) by the sale of securities 
and by the Central Bank's success in persuading 
the banks to follow its recommendations. In fact, 
the objective of the Central Bank's anti-cyclical 
policy was not so much to counteract the expan-
sionary effect of the increase in exports and in 
capital inflows as it was to sterilize the banks' 
excess liquidity. Fortunately, this policy pre-
vented the improvement of the banks' portfolios 
from having an explosive impact and thereby 
made this a cost-free measure of enormous 
benefit to the nation. 
The effectiveness of the Bank's anti-cyclical 
policies is clearly illustrated in figure 1, which 
shows the trends observed in the means of pay-
ment and in gold and foreign-exchange reserves 
during the period in question, as well as the 
effect on the former of variations in the latter, 
with the residual representing the effect of 
changes in domestic credit. Figure 1 and table 5 
have been taken, with slight adaptions, from the 
annual reports of the Central Bank, in which 
Raúl Prebisch first applied a technique of analy-
sis that was later systematized and refined by 
Robert Triffin. This technique is used today, 
with a number of variations and refinements, by 
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Figure 1 
ARGENTINA: MEANS OF PAYMENT BY ORIGIN, 1935-1943 
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central banks and international monetary 
institutions.15 
Figure 1 and table 5 show that the anti-
cyclical policy entirely cancelled out the potential 
•'Robert Triffin, Esbozo gênerai de un análisis de las series 
estadísticas monetarias y bancarias de América Latina sobre bases 
uniformes y comparables, First Conference of Central Ba nk Tech-
nical Experts of the Americas, Mexico City, 1946. 
impact of the increase in liquidity generated by 
the unblocking of bank portfolios and largely 
offset the monetary effect of the growth of 
reserves resulting from the rise in exports. 
Between May 1935 and July 1937 the country's 
international reserves climbed by 840 million 
pesos, whereas the money supply rose by only 
590 million pesos; this means that the sale of 
securities and the public's saving habits steril-
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Table 5 
A R G E N T I N A : MEANS OF P A Y M E N T BY ORIGIN, 1935-1943 
































































































Source: Central Bank of the Argentine Republic, annual reports. 
"International reserves in gold and foreign exchange. 
Loans and investments of the banking system. 
cSum of the above two quantities. The total is equivalent to money plus quasi-money {M2). 
Savings and time deposits, other term obligations of banks and absorption of funds by the Foreign Exchange Fund. 
'Currency outside banks plus demand deposits. 
ized 250 million pesos of the potential expan-
sion of the money supply. These results are truly 
astounding, even for those of us who already 
have a boundless admiration for the work of 
Prebisch. 
In July 1937 exports began to drop and con-
tinued to do so until late 1938. This decrease in 
exports, which reduced their value by around 
40% in the space of one and one-half years, 
affected domestic economic activity and resulted 
in a decline in reserves. Faced with this situation, 
the Bank recommended that the government 
tighten its exchange controls and require 
licenses for those imports which had been enter-
ing the country without them through the free 
market. At the same time, the Bank started to 
repurchase the securities it had sold during the 
upswing of the economic cycle, thus permitting 
the banks to maintain and even slightly increase 
their lending volumes. The economic slowdown 
also led to a reduction in time deposits, and the 
spontaneous absorption of the money supply by 
the public therefore diminished. Between July 
1937 and December 1938 the money supply 
declined by only 6.8% despite the fact that inter-
national reserves were drawn down by 43-5%. 
The following year, export values regained some 
of the lost ground and the money supply 
increased by approximately the same amount as 
did international reserves. In 1938 the gross 
domestic product shrank 2.8%, but in 1939 it 
recovered, growing by 4.5%. 
In May 1940 the intensification of the war 
had the effect of shutting down the market for 
Argentine products in the European continent, 
shifting import trade towards the United States, 
and creating an imbalance between the inflows 
and outflows of foreign exchange, with the result 
that there was an abundant supply of pounds 
sterling and a serious shortage of dollars. This 
made it necessary for Argentina to establish con-
trols which discriminated against imports from 
the United States. Later on, the United States' 
purchases of Argentine products increased 
sharply, but its sales remained very low due to 
war shortages. As a result, Argentina's reserves 
in gold and foreign exchange soared. Between 
1940 and 1943 its reserves grew at an average 
annual rate of 37.5%, which pushed up the 
money supply by an average annual rate of 
23.0% during the three years in question. Des-
pite the difficulties caused by the war and the 
need to finance harvest surpluses, the Central 
Bank was able to hold down the growth of the 
money supply to a rate far below that of the 
increase in international reserves. 
The Central Bank's policies during the war 
were just as efficient as its anti-cyclical measures 
of 1935-1939 but it was the latter which, because 
of their technical beauty, attracted international 
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attention. In his well-known analysis of the 
international monetary situation between the 
two world wars, Ragnar Nurkse referred to 
Argentina's monetary policy in the following 
terms: 
"Argentina provides the most striking 
example of the neutralization of cyclical pheno-
mena of both types (economic booms and reces-
sions) during the three years between 1936 and 
1939- Here, once again, mid-1937 was a critical 
period. The changes then occurring in the world 
market had a particularly strong effect on 
Argentina's balance of payments because they 
were reinforced by an inflow of external funds 
before this critical juncture and by an outflow of 
such funds after it, as well as by weather condi-
tions which produced an exceptionally good 
harvest before and a very poor harvest imme-
diately after this point in time. These events had 
surprisingly little effect on the domestic credit 
situation due to the quite notable policy of mone-
tary 'isolationism' that was applied during both 
the economic boom and the depression. The 
inflow of foreign exchange in 1936 and in the 
early months of 1937 was sterilized, firstly, by 
the Central Bank's sale of securities and, after 
November 1936, by the transfer of treasury cer-
tificates and bills to the market for purchases of 
foreign exchange on behalf of the government... 
The total amount of [foreign] exchange 
absorbed by these means reached a peak of over 
one billion pesos in June 1937, which were sold 
during the following 18 months. The proceeds 
from these sales were used to pay for the treasury 
bills and certificates which had been issued to 
finance them... Thanks to the neutralization pol-
icy, the monetary expansion observed in 1936-
1937 was moderate in comparison to the rise in 
exports and the inflow of funds; analogously, the 
decline in domestic credit during 1937-1938 was 
slight in comparison to the turnabout in the 
balance of external payments."14 
14. Model banking laws 
Argentina's experience served as an inspiration 
for Robert Triffin's work concerning the revi-
sion of the structure and functions of central 
"Ragnar Nurkse, La experiencia monetaria internacional, 
IMF/IDB/ŒMLA, Mexico City, 1968, p. 90. 
banks in developing countries, which was 
reflected in the laws of Paraguay, Guatemala, the 
Dominican Republic and Ecuador. These, ¡n 
their turn, served in part as a model for the laws 
which created the central banks of Chile and 
Honduras and for the modifications made in the 
banking laws of El Salvador and Venezuela. The 
work of Raul Prebisch can thus be said to have 
been the basis for the contemporary central 
banking system in Latin America. 
The beauty of the theories underlying the 
new banking laws and the promise these laws 
held out for neutralizing the economic cycle 
sparked the enthusiasm of Latin American econ-
omists. As a result, we placed our faith in mone-
tary and exchange policy as the key tool for 
solving many of our problems and concentrated 
our efforts on refining the techniques of mone-
tary analysis and the central banks' instruments 
of control as much as possible. This was a time 
during which we spent long hours discussing 
how to compute the revaluation of reserves in 
the classification of the means of payment by 
origin and attempting to create controls of all 
sorts that would make central banks better able 
to offset external fluctuations. 
Latin American economists' enthusiasm for 
the new banking laws and especially for their 
exchange provisions was not due so much to the 
contribution they might make to a more com-
plete neutralization of the economic cycle as it 
was to the fact that they offered a possibility of 
speeding up industrialization by making it possi-
ble to continue investing and growing during 
cyclical downswings: when exports declined, we 
freed the exchange rate for luxury imports, res-
tored our balances of payments to equilibrium 
and continued investing in industry and infras-
tructure, Our eagerness to apply the new mone-
tary policy was due to the fact that it provided an 
indirect instrument for promoting industrializa-
tion. However, once we had found a more direct 
route to our goal (thanks in large part to Pre-
bisch), it was then no longer necessary to take 
such a roundabout path, and we devoted our full 
attention to development theory and policy. 
Moreover, development policy could be applied 
in an anti-cyclical manner by intensifying the 
construction of infrastructure projects and the 
acquisition of external loans when exports were 
decreasing, thereby providing at least a partial 
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substitute for monetary policy as a neutralizer of 
the economic cycle. The actual circumstances 
involved were yet another factor, since trade 
fluctuations were much less notable after the war 
than they had been before it, and there was thus 
much less need to apply an anti-cyclical mone-
tary policy. 
Latin American economists' enthusiasm for 
monetary policy reached its height shortly after 
1945, attaining its maximum expression at the 
First Conference of Central Bank Technical 
Experts of the Americas, to which a number of 
references have been made. It rapidly waned 
during the 1950s as interest shifted to the theory 
and policy of economic development and to the 
study of the causes of inflation, which had 
already become a very serious problem in various 
Latin American countries before it made its 
appearance in the rest of the world. Partly 
because of this shift in interest and partly due to 
other causes, the rest of the cools which the new 
legislation made available to central banks were 
never used, either at the time of their creation or 
in subsequent years. In fact, during the past 40 
years no central bank has applied an active anti-
cyclical policy such as that implemented by Raúl 
Prebisch in Argentina in 1935-1943. 
15. Factors militating against the application 
of an anti-cyclical monetary policy 
in Latin America during the 
postwar period 
The loss of interest by Latin American econo-
mists in anti-cyclical monetary policy and the 
scant use made of this tool by financial authori-
ties during the four decades that have passed 
since the end of the war appear to be due to a 
variety of reasons. The most important of these 
seem to be the following: a) the predominance 
of development policy; b) the possibility of app-
lying development policy in an anti-cyclical 
fashion; c) the absence of sharp fluctuations in 
international trade; d) the fact that the new type 
of inflation that has emerged seems to be largely 
unaffected by credit restrictions, which have 
caused severe economic contractions; e) the 
impossibility of applying a consistent monetary 
policy in the presence of a combination of infla-
tion and unemployment; f) the increase in inter-
est rates in industrial countries; g) the 
tax-exempt status of foreign deposits in the Uni-
ted States; and h) the debt crisis. 
As a result of the sharp inflationary surges 
observed in various Latin American countries 
around 1950, a great deal of importance was 
initially placed on monetary policy. However, 
this inflation proved to be highly resistant to 
monetary restrictions, which had a much greater 
effect on production than on prices; these res-
trictions therefore gave rise to a steep increase in 
unemployment, but prices continued rising in 
spite of this. Such restrictions thus produced a 
situation of "stagflation", with the economy suf-
fering from both unemployment and inflation at 
the same time. Given this situation, which is 
entirely contrary to the teachings of economic 
theory, What monetary policy should be fol-
lowed? Should a tight credit policy be continued 
in the hope that, after a sufficiently long period 
of time, prices will drop, or should the con-
straints on credit be lifted in order to stimulate 
production and employment? "Stagflation" has 
thus prevented the application of a consistent 
monetary policy, and it continues to do so today. 
The above-mentioned factors which have 
discouraged or hampered the application of 
monetary policy have been compounded, more 
recently, by the rise in interest rates in the indus-
trial countries, the tax exemption of foreign dep-
osits in the United States, and the debt crisis. 
The first two of these factors have augmented 
the outflow of capital from Latin America, 
already greatly encouraged by exchange instabil-
ity, and have created additional difficulties for 
monetary policy-makers by presenting them 
with the dilemma of whether to raise domestic 
interest rates, which would keep capital within 
the region but would also slow down the econ-
omy, or to lower them, which would stimulate 
the economy but would also intensify the out-
flow of capital from the region. The third factor, 
the debt crisis, has created extremely severe 
problems for monetary policy by siphoning off 
an enormous amount of resources. 
16. What lessons are to be learned 
from Prebisch's handling of 
monetary affairs? 
This brief examination of the difficulties in rela-
tion to monetary policy which have been 
encountered in the past 40 years might, at first 
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glance, give the mistaken impression that Raúl 
Prebisch's admirable performance at the helm of 
the Central Bank of the Argentine Republic 
offers relatively few lessons that could be of use 
in resolving today's problems. What greater 
benefit could we hope to derive, however, from a 
study of his performance than to gain an under-
standing of the economic and financial changes 
that have occurred in Latin America and the 
world during those 40 years ? What better way of 
grasping the essential importance which mone-
tary policy still has for economic development 
and social well-being than to understand how 
the situation in which such policy is to be applied 
has changed? 
An analysis of the eight factors listed above 
indicates that the teachings of Prebisch remain 
valid, because the first three factors are not 
obstacles as such but rather circumstantial fac-
tors which caused a higher priority to be placed 
on other policies, while the last five factors, 
although they do represent real obstacles, have 
their origin in international problems which, 
even though they have gone unresolved for a 
number of years, will, we should trust, be solved 
in the not too distant future. We can and should, 
therefore, re-examine the techniques used by 
Raúl Prebisch and use them to promote the 
region's economic development within a context 
of financial stability. 
Two of the real obstacles have their roots in 
inflation, and their future significance will there-
fore depend on how much progress we make in 
our struggle to halt this process. In recent years 
this problem has grown worse as a result of the 
heavy blow dealt to the region by the debt crisis. 
Nonetheless, the better understanding that 
economists both in Latin America and elsewhere 
now have of the mechanisms of persistent infla-
tion and of stagflation gives us reason to believe 
that not much more time will pass before we 
have practical and effective formulas for over-
coming this critical problem.15 This optimism 
nIn this connection, see Inflación, aceleración y contención, 
Pensamiento Iberoamericano, No. 9, Madrid, January-June 1986; 
Rudíger Dornbusch, Inflation and Indexation, Comments on 
Brazil, Institute for Inrernational Economics, Washington, D.C., 
1985; and, by the author, Inflation, lixchange Rates and Stabiliza-
tion, Essays in International Finance, Princeton University, 1986; 
and Michael Bruno and Jeffrey Sachs, Economics of Worldwide 
Stagflation, Harvard University Press, 1985. 
does not, however, mean that we should desist in 
our efforts to fathom the remaining enigmas 
posed by inflation. 
The next two obstacles to an effective appli-
cation of monetary policy stem from the greater 
attractiveness for Latin American savers of the 
possibility of making deposits in industrial coun-
tries due to the increase in interest rates in these 
nations. Making such deposits in the United 
States is the most attractive option of all because 
there such deposits are tax free. Latin American 
savers thus have the choice of holding their 
liquid funds in securities denominated in weak 
and depreciating currencies and of paying taxes 
on the interest earned, or of acquiring securities 
denominated in dollars which are rising in value 
in terms of the national currency of the pur-
chaser, provide returns at a relatively high rate 
of interest and are exempt from taxes. There can 
be little doubt as to which alternative they will 
choose! It is to be hoped, however, that in the not 
too distant future the United States will levy a 
heavy tax on financial deposits made by resi-
dents of developing countries or, even better, 
offer to sign tax agreements with these countries 
whereby it would undertake to charge, on their 
behalf, the taxes they levy on foreign financial 
deposits by their residents. The transfers of capi-
tal now being made by poor countries to rich 
countries constitute a process which is so tho-
roughly illogical and so contrary to the most 
basic principles of equity that this hope ought 
not to be entirely illusory. 
The last of the obstacles mentioned above, 
the debt crisis, concerned Prebisch during the 
final years of his life. Indeed, just five days before 
his death, he said "the present bilateral negotia-
tions cannot drag on indefinitely because, so long 
as the region's economies are being drained in 
order to generate resources with which to pay 
the service on the debt, there will be no invest-
ment, either domestic or foreign, since capital is 
not invested in economies that are not growing 
or are declining and that are subject to increasing 
social pressures".16 The debt crisis cannot be 
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allowed to continue to hold back Latin American 
and world progress for much longer. 
Once the obstacles which have stood in the 
way of an effective application of monetary pol-
icy are overcome, as they will have to be in the 
fairly near future, Raúl Prebisch's teachings con-
cerning monetary and banking affairs will once 
again come into their own. 
